


THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA

ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND LEGAL STUDIES

# WORKING PAPER SERIES



Working Paper No. 08-08-02

Elected Versus Appointed County Commission Executives:  
Political Favors and Support Facilities

**Gary A. Hoover**

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:  
Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies Working Paper Series Index:  
[www.cba.ua.edu](http://www.cba.ua.edu)

Culverhouse College of Commerce and Business Administration  
The University of Alabama

# Elected Versus Appointed County Commission Executives: Political Favors and Support Facilities

Gary A. Hoover<sup>\*</sup>  
University of Alabama  
Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies  
Box 870224  
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0224  
Ph: 205-348-6033  
Email: [ghoover@bama.ua.edu](mailto:ghoover@bama.ua.edu)

## **Abstract:**

In this paper we explore the impact of elected and appointed county commission executives on expenditures and employment opportunities. Political pandering could mean that elected officials behave in a manner that is distinctly different from their appointed counterparts. In addition, we explore whether there is any appreciable difference when elected officials are chosen for a single task i.e. county administration as opposed to those with multiple tasks, i.e. county probate judges. We find that in areas where there is more discretion, elected officials tend to have higher per capita expenditures. However, there does not appear to be any difference in employment practices between the two groups.

**Keywords:** Government Expenditures, Representative Democracy, Public Input  
**JEL:** I28,I29

---

<sup>\*</sup> The author wishes to thank seminar participants at the University of Konstanz. Additional thanks to J. Edwin Benton. The usual caveats remain concerning any errors.

## INTRODUCTION

How public officials are assigned to their posts is an area of continuing interest to social scientists from many different areas. Should certain public officials be elected or appointed to their posts is a question that researchers have devoted tremendous resources towards answering. This paper looks at outcomes when county commission executives are elected or appointed to their posts.

There have been arguments for and against election of public officials. One of the most common complaints against election of public officials is the distraction that can accompany getting elected and then getting reelected. If officials are more concerned with election issues than the duties of office, it is argued that public welfare could suffer. Finally, it is posited that having officials that are elected makes the office less stable since there will be greater turnover associated with the position.

Conversely, having public officials that are elected more accurately reflects the desire of the public in selecting whom will represent them. If public officials are concerned with reflecting the wishes of the voting public, they will be more receptive to input from voters.

There is also the issue of whether certain tasks should be assigned to certain types of officials given that, ultimately, maximization of public welfare is the desired outcome. Alesina and Tabellini (2007) surmise “Politicians [elected officials] are motivated by the goal of pleasing voters, and hence winning elections. Top bureaucrats [appointed officials] are motivated by “career concerns,” that is, they want to fulfill the goals of the organization because this improves their external professional prospects in the public or private sector.”

## LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been a great deal of research done on elected versus appointed officials by researchers in the economics field. None of that research, until now, has dealt with county officials. However, there has been a great deal of research in this area done by scholars in public administration.

The recent economic theoretical literature has focused on which tasks are optimally done by certain types of officials. In models where officials are responsible for multiple tasks, Alesina and Tabellini (2006) find that elected officials are better suited for tasks where time inconsistency is not a concern and flexibility is required, while elected officials are better suited for tasks where technical skills are required. In Alesina and Tabellini (2007), the authors give results for a single policy task.

In a model that examines public efficiency when there is a choice between elected officials, appointed officials, or a referendum, Maskin and Tirole (2004) find that, among other things, “The most important decisions should be taken by elected rather than nonaccountable officials (although direct democracy may have the edge over representative democracy for such decisions).” However, Alesina and Tirole (2005) show that decisions concerning monetary policy are improved when they are the responsibility of independent bureaucrats.

Scholars have also investigated the impact of elected versus appointed officials in the utilities regulation industry. Beasley and Coate (2003) and Holburn and Spiller (2002) find evidence that elected regulators are more “pro consumer” since consumers are voters. However, Gormley (1983) does not find any difference in regulators that are elected or appointed.

There has also been research regarding elected versus appointed judges. Recent research has been done by Hanssen (1999) and Beasley and Payne (2003) in this area. In addition, Hoover (2008) investigates student performance when various school officials are elected or appointed.

Public administration scholars studying the issue of elected versus appointed county commission executives have had mixed results regarding expenditures and none have explored the political economy aspects of governance style as they relate to employment. Work by Schneider and Park (1989) and DeSantis and Renner (1996) showed that counties with elected executives had higher levels of spending. However, for a much smaller sample of 20 counties, Morgan and Kickham (1999) find no differences in spending or revenues given governance structure.

Benton (2002b) found that elected executives in counties with populations greater than 100,000 spent more money and accounted for a greater proportion of local government expenditures than their appointed counterparts.

However, most work in this area lacks econometric analysis and depends on comparisons of descriptive statistics over time. Park (1996) does use econometric techniques but only examines the growth of counties over time. In addition, this work does not distinguish between counties that are in states that do not allow much, if any flexibility in county governance, known more commonly as “home rule” thus making the results biased in favor of those counties without elected county executives. An excellent overview of recent findings on public administration contributions to this area can be found in Benton (2005).

Our paper is not an attempt to explain why certain counties chose one governance structure over another. It is an effort to examine whether there is a difference in expenditure and employment practices given the two forms. The rest of the paper is as follows: the next section gives a description of the data used and the issues involved in the econometric modeling of the data, we then have a section that discusses the results of our modeling followed by a section with conclusions and policy implications.

## **DATA and MODEL**

Our dataset is a cross section of all counties in the United States during the year 2000. There were 3,142 counties in the United States during this period of investigation.

The data used in this paper come from several sources. From the website of the National Association of Counties (NACo) we gathered data on whether the county executive was elected or appointed to the position where elected could mean solely for the purpose of administration of daily county tasks or where one of the elected members of the county commission serves as chief executive. In addition, the NACo website gave us information about which counties were in states that allowed for county level home rule. Every five years the US Census Bureau conducts its Census of Governments. From that report we were able to gather data concerning county finances, including categorical expenditure and revenues sources. In addition, we used the County and City Data Book: 2000 from the US Census Bureau for demographic information for each county. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics on the entire dataset and for those counties with elected and appointed county executives.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Some data points were lost due to missing pieces of information. This loss reduced the number of usable observations in the regression results compared to those used in the descriptive statistics.

As mentioned previously, the comparison group should be between counties that have elected versus appointed county executives, however, the reader should be mindful that not all counties in the country have the ability to make that choice. Only those counties in states that have a charter or “Home Rule” would have the option to choose. During the time period of this investigation, 27 states had charters that allowed them to choose the form of governance.

To date, there has been very little formal econometric modeling of these issues. As mentioned before, the majority of the research in this area has come from researchers in public administration who have relied mostly on comparisons of descriptive statistics. One of the few formal econometric models in the area was presented by Park (1996). As mentioned earlier, Park (1996) had several serious econometric limitations. In addition, there are no factors controlling for scale effects in his work. Our paper takes all of these issues into account.

The first issue that should be addressed in modeling for an investigation of this nature is that of endogeneity. Any results derived from a mis-specified model that has not correctly accounted for endogeneity will be biased. Our concern is that expenditures or employment influence the selection of a governance form. We use a Hausman Test to examine whether some form of Instrumental Variables (IV) would be appropriate. Our results show that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) would be the preferred model.<sup>2</sup>

For our dependent variables we have per capita total expenditures at the county level. Most of the previous research in this area has used expenditures but many have failed to account for population size. In addition, most previous research breaks down

---

<sup>2</sup> The test statistic for the Hausman Test was 13.08 with  $Pr > ChiSq$  of 0.01532 that OLS was preferred over 2SLS.

general spending into the categories that comprise it. We follow suit in that regard but limit our analysis to two categories: education spending and spending on parks. We reason that due to state certification and union status, it would be difficult for an elected county executive to have a high degree of influence regarding education spending. However, expenditures on parks could be more easily influenced by a county executive.

In addition to expenditures, we explore the per capita number of employees in county government and consequently in education and parks. This area has not been explored in the previous literature. We reason that political patronage does not have to be exhibited in the form of expenditures but could be manifested in jobs. Once again, we reason that the effects of a county executives power is more likely to be manifested in parks than education.

For explanatory variables we are consistent with the literature and begin with data on the county executive. As mentioned previously, the county executive can be appointed or elected. Table 1 reveals that approximately 12 percent of our sample have elected county executives. Our a priori assumptions would be that elected executives do not behave the same regarding expenditures and employment as do their appointed counterparts.

We also have data on the percentage of the county population that is black. If counties are predominantly populated by persons of this cohort, the decisions that county executives make regarding expenditure and employment decisions could vary regardless of governance structure.<sup>3</sup> In addition, we include a variable that measures the size of the adult labor force in the county in the year 2000. Decisions concerning the size of

---

<sup>3</sup> See McManus (1996).

government (in terms of expenditure and employment) would be greatly impacted by the number of workers in the community.

Like nearly all previous papers in this area, we include per capita income which most previous work has shown to have a positive impact on expenditures. We also include population per square mile to account for scale effects of county services. In essence, it should be more convenient to provide county services to a densely populated area as opposed to one that is sparsely populated leading to multiple locations for essential services.

In addition, we have followed most other researchers by including the county level unemployment rate. Research has shown that there is increased need for county services during periods of high unemployment but generally a retraction in services offered during those same periods due to decreasing tax revenues. There has not been clear evidence of which way this effect will be manifested.

We also have data on the per capita revenues that counties receive from both the federal and state government. Park (1996) showed that state aid was statistically significant while federal aid was only significant for certain expenditure categories.

Finally, we include the percent of the county population residing in metropolitan areas. Since many services could be provided by either the county or city, it is conceivable that counties that are counties in name only will have most services provided by city governments. Certain counties in the Northeastern portion of the country are particularly likely to have this type of situation.

## **RESULTS**

We begin our analysis by examining the impact of the independent variables on total general expenditures as shown in Column 1 of Table 2. The results on total general expenditures are not surprising. Most variables had no impact at all. Of the list of demographic variables only the percent of population that is black and the adult labor force were significant. The sign of the estimated coefficient for blacks is very small and positive implying that county expenditures increase as the percentage of blacks in the community increase. The sign on the estimated coefficient of the adult labor force is very small but negative which is counter to our a priori expectations. The variable with the largest significant estimated coefficient was the amount of revenues coming from the state. This result is in line with previous research. What is interesting is that the estimated coefficient on elected county executives is not significant at standard levels. Whether elected or appointed, what matters most in expenditure decisions seems to be revenues.

To further explore the robustness of these results and to be consistent with previous research in this area we look at two different categories of expenditures. Namely, expenditures on county level education and parks are examined. The results are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1. Interestingly, revenues from the state are not significant in either regression but revenues from the federal government are. This result is not so surprising for education which has a large federal oversight and grant component or parks which has a large federal grant component. Other demographic variables had varying levels of significance in the two models.

Elected county executives did not have an impact on overall county expenditures but did have a slightly significant positive impact on park expenditures. This fits our a priori expectations given that expenditures on parks would receive less scrutiny than

education expenditures and would therefore be more likely to be influenced by an elected executive. It is not surprising that there was no difference in the overall expenditure equation given that parks spending made up less than 3 percent of total per capita spending while education was more than 48 percent of spending. It should be noted, however, that the regression for park expenditures has an adjusted  $R^2$  of only 0.2989.

What has not been explored by previous researchers is whether elected county executives are more inclined to hire more employees for county services. As mentioned earlier, political patronage, in terms of jobs, could explain differences in the number of county workers employed. To investigate this, we examine the per capita number of employees working for the county.

In Column 1 of Table 3 we run our independent variables on the per capita number of total employees in the county. The only two demographic variables that had any impact on total per capita employment were the poverty rate and population per square mile. Our a priori expectations were that scale effects would be negatively related to expenditures and employment and, at least regarding employment, the effect was negative and significant although the estimated coefficient was very small. Once again, revenues from the state were positively significant in explaining total employment.

As was the case with expenditures, there was no impact on total per capita employment by executives that were elected to the position.

To further explore the effects of an elected executive on employment, in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, we examine the per capita number of employees in both education and parks. As with expenditures, several demographic variables were significant for both education and parks employment, although the size of the estimated coefficients are

small. Unlike the expenditures regressions, elected executives had no significant impact on employment in either education, where we would not have expected, or in parks employment, where an influence would have been more likely.

As mentioned earlier, not all elected executives are chosen exclusively to perform those tasks associated with county governance. For instance, some county executives also serve as probates judges or are members of the county commission. We test whether having these additional duties had any impact on expenditure or employment outcomes at the county level.

In Column 1 of Table 4 we explored the impact that additional duties to the county executive office might have on expenditure decisions. In Column 2 of Table 4 we do the same analysis for employment outcomes of county executives with other responsibilities. In neither case did we find any significant difference in expenditure or employment outcomes for county executives with additional responsibilities.

## **CONCLUSIONS and POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

What our analysis showed is that overall expenditures were not impacted by having either an elected or appointed county commission executive. The constraining factor for all executives was revenues, whether state or federal. In areas where we did not expect influence to matter, there was none but in expenditures on parks, an area with greater discretion we found that elected executives had higher and significant expenditures.

However, we found no difference in overall or categorical hiring by either elected or appointed officials. In addition, we did not find that elected county executives who

were selected with responsibilities for several tasks, i.e. county judges, behaved any differently from their counterparts selected for a single task.

Since there is no appreciable difference in hiring and only slight differences in expenditures between elected and appointed county executives, the obvious question is why have the different forms of governance? It has been speculated by Hoover (2008) that even though outcomes may not vary, voters feel a greater sense of involvement when public officials are elected. This is clearly an area for future research.

## REFERENCES

- Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini. 2007. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task. *American Economic Review* 97 (1): 169 – 179.
- . 2006. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Tasks. Mimeo.
- Benton, J., Edwin. 2005. An Assessment of Research on American Counties. *Public Administration Review* 65 (4): 462 – 474.
- Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 2003. Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Evidence and Theory. *Journal of the European Economic Association* 1 (5): 1176 - 1206.
- Besley, Timothy, and A. Abigail Payne. 2003. Judicial Accountability and Economic Policy Outcomes: Evidence from Employment Discrimination Charges. Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, UK.
- DeSantis, Victor S., and Tari Renner. 1993. Governing the County: Authority, Structure, and Election. In *County Governments in an Era of Change*, edited by David R. Berman, 55 – 84. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Gormley, William, T. 1983. *The Politics of Public Utility Regulation*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Hanssen, Andrew. 1999. The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges. *Journal of Legal Studies* 28: 205 – 232.
- Holburn, Guy, and Pablo Spiller. 2002. Interest Group Representation in Administrative Institutions: The Impact of Consumer Advocates and Elected Commissioners on

- Regulatory Policy in the United States. University of California Energy Institute (UCEI) Energy Policy and Economics Working Paper 002, Berkeley, CA.
- Hoover, Gary, A. 2008. Elected versus Appointed School District Officials: Is there a Difference in Student Outcomes? *Public Finance Review* 36 (5): .
- Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. 2004. The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government. *American Economic Review* 94 (4): 1034 – 1054.
- McManus, Susan, A. 1996. County Boards, Partisanship, and Elections. In *The American County: Frontiers in Knowledge*, edited by Donald C. Menzel, 53 – 79. University of Alabama Press.
- Morgan, David, R., and Kenneth Kickham. 1999. Changing the Form of County Government: Effects on Revenue and Expenditure Policy. *Public Administration Review* 59 (4): 315 – 324.
- Park, Kee Ok. 1996. Determinants of County Government Growth. In *The American County: Frontiers in Knowledge*, edited by Donald C. Menzel, 34 – 50. University of Alabama Press.
- Schneider, Mark, and Kee Ok Park. 1989. Metropolitan Counties as Service Delivery Agents: The Still Forgotten Governments. *Public Administration Review* 49 (4): 345 – 352.

**Table 1**  
Descriptive Statistics All Counties

Variable	Number	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Elected Exec	1511	0.1171	0.3216	0.0	1.0
Percent Black	1475	6.2314	11.3142	0.0	79.0
Adult Labor Force	1508	59,697.92	182,376.92	272.0	4761357.0
Per Cap. Income	1509	34042.02	8339.12	9213.0	77513.0
Poverty Rate	1509	13.8388	5.6944	0.0	46.4
Population per Square Mile	1508	381.8468	2366.79	0.100	66834.6
Unemployment Rate	1508	4.7380	2.6597	0.60	27.50
Per Cap. Rev. From Federal Govt. (thousands)	961	0.0567	0.1261	0.00002	2.1396
Per Cap. Rev. From State Govt. (thousands)	1238	0.4143	0.4180	0.00091	4.8509
Percent Population Living in City	257	0.4585	0.2929	0.0195	0.9901
Per Cap. Total Gen. Expenditures	1241	1.1577	1.2861	0.0349	34.7932
Per Cap. Expend. on Educ.	525	0.5727	0.8285	0.00004	8.5272
Per Cap. Expend on Parks	1112	0.0307	0.0423	0.00002	0.4571
Per Cap. Total Employment	1422	0.0565	0.0302	0.0088	0.7529
Per Cap. Employ. for Educ.	1422	0.0256	0.0100	0.0	0.2647
Per Cap. Employ. for Parks	1503	0.0100	0.0122	0.0	0.1434

**Table 1A**

Descriptive Statistics for Counties with Elected County Executives

Variable	Number	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Percent Black	177	9.3728	13.0867	0.10	67.30
Adult Labor Force	177	137646.36	238131.64	314.00	1512941.0
Per Cap. Income	177	36171.97	10556.73	18529.0	68024.0
Poverty Rate	177	13.7468	5.1459	4.40	30.30
Population per Square Mile	177	680.0621	1667.80	0.10	12956.90
Unemployment Rate	177	5.1723	2.8734	1.30	26.30
Per Cap. Rev. From Federal Govt. (thousands)	139	0.0671	0.2387	0.0001	2.139
Per Cap. Rev. From State Govt. (thousands)	157	0.7112	0.4746	0.0243	3.4077
Percent Population Living in City	62	0.3953	0.2204	0.0195	1.0
Per Cap. Total Gen. Expenditures	157	1.9221	2.8472	0.2788	34.7932
Per Cap. Expend. on Educ.	144	0.9320	1.0660	0.0004	8.5272
Per Cap. Expend on Parks	153	0.0273	0.0504	0.0005	0.4192
Per Cap. Total Employment	161	0.0489	0.0327	0.0123	0.3126
Per Cap. Employ. for Educ.	161	0.02382	0.0101	0.0	0.0951
Per Cap. Employ. for Parks	177	0.0139	0.0187	0.0	0.1434

**Table 1B**

## Descriptive Statistics for Counties with Appointed County Executives

Variable	Number	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Percent Black	1298	5.803	10.9868	0.0	79.00
Adult Labor Force	1331	49332.13	171007.97	272.00	4761357.0
Per Cap. Income	1332	33758.99	7960.45	9213.0	77513.0
Poverty Rate	1332	13.8511	5.7650	0.0001	46.40
Population per Square Mile	1331	342.1893	2442.48	0.10	66834.6
Unemployment Rate	1331	4.68	2.62	0.60	27.5
Per Cap. Rev. From Federal Govt. (thousands)	822	0.054	0.0948	0.00002	1.539
Per Cap. Rev. From State Govt. (thousands)	1081	0.3711	0.3910	0.0009	4.8509
Percent Population Living in City	195	0.47859	0.3103	0.0417	2.708
Per Cap. Total Gen. Expenditures	1084	1.047	0.7932	0.0349	9.2963
Per Cap. Expend. on Educ.	381	0.4370	0.6719	4.8x10 <sup>-6</sup>	6.889
Per Cap. Expend on Parks	959	0.0312	0.0409	0.00002	0.4571
Per Cap. Total Employment	1261	0.0574	0.0297	0.0088	0.7529
Per Cap. Employ. for Educ.	1261	0.0259	0.010	0.0	0.2647
Per Cap. Employ. for Parks	1326	0.0095	0.0110	0.0	0.1273

**Table 2**  
County Per Capita Expenditures Across Various Categories

Variable	Total General Expend.	Education Expend.	Park Expend.
Intercept	0.8075 (1.38)	0.8407* (3.32)	0.0994** (2.55)
Elected Exec	-0.0070 (-0.10)	-0.0036 (-0.13)	0.0175** (2.83)
Percent Black	0.0115* (2.96)	-0.0014 (-1.01)	0.0007** (2.22)
Adult Labor Force	$-6.184 \times 10^{-7}$ * (-5.04)	$-3.1247 \times 10^{-8}$ (-1.38)	$5.8435 \times 10^{-9}$ (0.95)
Per Cap. Income	$-0.0005 \times 10^{-2}$ (-0.68)	$3.80 \times 10^{-5}$ (1.23)	$-0.124 \times 10^{-5}$ ** (-1.87)
Poverty Rate	-0.0291 (-1.65)	-0.0038 (-0.55)	-0.0044* (-2.96)
Population per Square Mile	$-0.0002 \times 10^{-2}$ (-0.12)	$-1.062 \times 10^{-5}$ (1.23)	$0.137 \times 10^{-5}$ (0.61)
Unemployment Rate	-0.0022 (-0.18)	0.0077*** (1.74)	0.0001 (0.18)
Per Cap. Rev. From Federal Govt.	0.8445 (1.25)	0.5914** (2.39)	0.1144** (2.18)
Per Cap. Rev. From State Govt.	1.3911* (6.97)	0.4090* (5.16)	0.0177 (1.15)
Percent Population Living in City	-0.0328 (-0.31)	0.0308 (0.50)	-0.0094 (-1.02)
Number of Obs.	219	118	215
Adjust R <sup>2</sup>	0.7684	0.9431	0.2989

Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table 3**

## County Per Capita Employment Across Various Categories

Variable	Total County Employ	Education Employ.	Park Employ.
Intercept	0.0238*** (1.87)	0.0108** (2.44)	0.0157 (1.39)
Elected Exec	0.0011 (0.69)	0.0009 (1.29)	0.0017 (0.97)
Percent Black	-9.015x10 <sup>-5</sup> (-1.02)	-0.00004 (-1.28)	0.0003* (3.13)
Adult Labor Force	2.6696x10 <sup>-10</sup> (0.17)	4.5804x10 <sup>-11</sup> (0.06)	1.7230x10 <sup>-9</sup> (0.95)
Per Cap. Income	1.2362x10 <sup>-7</sup> (0.69)	1.8314x10 <sup>-7**</sup> (2.39)	9.8592x10 <sup>-8</sup> (0.50)
Poverty Rate	0.0006*** (1.76)	0.0005* (3.04)	-0.0006 (-1.48)
Population per Square Mile	-1.54x10 <sup>-6*</sup> (-2.62)	-1.50x10 <sup>-6*</sup> (-5.69)	2.35x10 <sup>-6*</sup> (3.49)
Unemployment Rate	3.109x10 <sup>-5</sup> (0.11)	2.064x10 <sup>-5</sup> (0.17)	0.0002 (0.89)
Per Cap. Rev. From Federal Govt.	0.0034 (0.24)	-0.0056 (-0.92)	0.0161 (1.04)
Per Cap. Rev. From State Govt.	0.0088** (1.95)	0.0021 (1.19)	-0.0076*** (-1.68)
Percent Population Living in City	0.0002 (0.12)	-0.0002 (-0.20)	0.0014 (0.55)
Number of Obs.	219	219	219
Adjust R <sup>2</sup>	0.3338	0.5242	0.5445

Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table 4**

## County Per Capita Expenditures Of Executives with Other Duties

Variable	Total General Expenditures	Total Employment
Intercept	0.7954 (0.47)	0.0381** (2.27)
Elected Exec with Other Duties	0.2422 (1.14)	-0.0053 (-1.65)
Percent Black	0.0074 (1.04)	-0.0001 (-1.32)
Adult Labor Force	$-8.333 \times 10^{-7}$ *** (-1.83)	$-4.4809 \times 10^{-9}$ (-0.62)
Per Cap. Income	$-1.021 \times 10^{-5}$ (-0.55)	$-3.4534 \times 10^{-8}$ (-0.12)
Poverty Rate	-0.0479 (-1.13)	0.0003 (0.60)
Population per Square Mile	$-1.747 \times 10^{-5}$ (-0.34)	$-2.17 \times 10^{-6}$ * (-2.76)
Unemployment Rate	0.0200 (0.53)	0.0009 (1.60)
Per Cap. Rev. From Federal Govt.	-0.8736 (-0.38)	0.0085 (0.25)
Per Cap. Rev. From State Govt.	1.8869* (3.99)	0.0008 (0.12)
Percent Population Living in City	0.3556 (0.75)	0.0051 (0.77)
Number of Obs.	85	85
Adjust R <sup>2</sup>	0.6312	0.4863

Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.